concerning the direction of arrows

In the article

Nishida's Philosophy of `Place',
International Philosophical Quarterly,
28(4), 1988, pp. 355-371,

the author, Masao Abe, talks about the difference between

dog -is a-> mammal

and

mammal -particularizes to-> dog.

In the first way of thinking, we end up with

Ralph -is a-> dog -is a-> mammal -is a-> ... ->thing,

and Ralph is the "subject that cannot be a predicate".
("Are you a Ralph?" is so 'Pixar'...)

On the other hand, considering the chain

the universe -particularizes to-> ...-> dog -particularizes to-> Ralph,

we end up considering "a predicate that cannot be subject" -- what
Nishida and Abe choose to call ABSOLUTE NOTHINGNESS, since
they deem that phrase to be adequate to describe the 'something'
about which nothing sensible can ever really be said, i.e., the 'thing'
that is never a grammatical subject.  (Henceforth abbreviated to
"Mu".)

But, by Saint Sebastian! -- isn't that 'thing' the "Body without
Organs" from Deleuze et al.?

Or, shall we go back further, to

Empiricism and Subjectivity: An essay on Hume's theory of human nature
Gilles Deleuze, 1953
trans. Constantin V. Boundas, 1991, Columbia Univ. Press

wherein Deleuze remarks: "The mind and the given are not derived
from such-and-such an idea but rather from the smallest idea, whether
it is used to represent the grain of sand or a fraction of it.  This is
why, finally, the problem of the status of the mind is the same as
the problem of space.  On the one hand, we ask whether or not
extension is infinitely divisible.  On the other hand, the indivisible
ideas, to the extent that they are indivisible, constitute in a certain
way extension."

And just how does that work?  He quotes Hume: "Five notes play'd
on a flute give us the impression and idea of time; tho' time be not
a sixth impression, which presents itself to the hearing or any other
of the senses."

These indivisible things can be brought into all sorts of relations
with each other, but still, their indivisible nature brings them
quite close to "Mu".  Still, they're not "Mu" -- maybe they're
"U"! (from Joshu's "alternate answer" to 'does a dog have
Buddha nature?' -- "U" means /being/ or /having/).  The smallest
ideas are the most elementary grammatical subjects.

This this matter of the 'direction of the arrows' reminded
me of another thing: Bayesian networks, in which, e.g.
a->b is essentially the same as a<-b (given P(a) and P(b),
P(a|b) and P(b|a) are informationally equivalent).  This, in short,
means that the direction of arrows in Bayesian networks doesn't
actually represent "causality", just "relatedness".

But I don't want to give you the impression that the direction
of arrows is somehow a completely arbitrary choice.

Abe makes a convincing case that the -is a-> arrows put us
in the mindset of an 'objective observer'.  Essentially a third
party to the discourse -- but without a solid understanding of
our own constitution.  On the other hand the -particularizes to->
arrows lead us directly to consider an evolving space, and
directly causes us to confront ourselves and our real constitution
as a part of this space.

Further, I think Hume and Nishida can easily be related, e.g.
insofar as 'clarifying one real Dharma' ("U", the first subjects)
is the same as 'attaining emptiness' ("Mu", the predicate
that is never a subject).

Finally, in light of the Hume-Nishida understanding of 'space',
I think I understand William S. Burroughs's famous statement
"I write for the space age" in a new light. His books are like
huge evolving networks, minds (i.e., spaces, places, or maps),
created not /in silica/, but (the translation itself is interesting) --
/in charta/.