to sum up: philosopher's phootball phantasy

Deconstruction is entirely a theory of relations of interiority,
even though it recognizes that such relations are never completed
but always still in process.

[...]

Note for further elaboration: a lot of this has to do with the way
that DeLanda, through Deleuze, is ultimately channelling Spinoza, to
whom the language of capacities to affect and be affected is
originally due; and also Hume — again via Deleuze's reading — in order
to account for how the individual person exists as an "emergent
property" of the assemblage of a quantity of impressions, ideas, and
chains of association. Now, Whitehead writes a lot about Spinoza and
particularly Hume, recognizing their importance but also their
limitations, which have to do with the fact that neither of them think
sufficiently in terms of events. Spinoza fails to think the event
because of his absolute monism; Hume, because of his denial of "causal
efficacy", and development of a theory of mind entirely in terms of
"presentational immediacy." Where Deleuze uneasily juxtaposes Spinoza
and Hume with Bergson, and DeLanda entirely ignores the Bergsonian
side of Deleuze in favor of the Spinozian side, Whitehead is the one
thinker who actually does — much better than Deleuze — integrate
(using this term in the mathematical sense) Spinozian and Bergsonian
imperatives. This needs to be explained further, in conjunction with
Whitehead's aphorism that "there is a becoming of continuity, but no
continuity of becoming" (Process and Reality 35). -
http://www.shaviro.com/Blog/?p=541